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MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL TEAM 
BANKRUPTCIES: 
WHO WINS?  WHO LOSES? 
John Dillon* 
 
Baseball is America’s sport.  It evokes a sense of tradition and a love 
for the home team.  Like all professional sports teams, however, baseball 
teams are part of a league, which restricts team ownership through contrac-
tual “constitutional” provisions and agreements and limits the number of 
teams that exist.  In this limited and restricted entertainment market, profes-
sional sports teams operate highly lucrative businesses that sometimes seek 
bankruptcy protection through Chapter 11 reorganization.  Bankruptcy gen-
erally allows the debtor to alter existing contractual rights and restructure its 
operations to avert the financial crisis that precipitated the bankruptcy filing.  
However, professional sports leagues have pre-existing contractual rights 
and remedies in place for the benefit and protection of all of their member 
teams that may conflict with bankruptcy laws, and the leagues try to enforce 
those rights, even in the bankruptcy arena.  The league’s existing contractual 
rights may conflict with bankruptcy laws that afford the debtor team to free 
itself from such obligations.  This Comment discusses the extent to which 
professional sports teams can make material business decisions affecting 
their Chapter 11 reorganization without complying with the league’s consti-
tution and associated agreements.  These conflicts are at the forefront of all 
professional sports team bankruptcies. The Dodgers bankruptcy provides a 
classic example of the clash between a debtor team’s rights in bankruptcy 
and MLB’s existing “constitutional” rights. 
 
 * J.D. Candidate, Loyola Law School, 2013; B.A., University of California, Los Angeles, 
2010.  The author would like to thank his parents and brother (Mark, Kim, and Matt) for their 
guidance and support throughout the author’s life.  In addition, the author would like to thank his 
wife Logan for her constant support through this publication process.  The author would also like 
to thank Loyola Law School Professor Dan Schechter and the author’s father, Mark Dillon, for 
their continuous help with editing this article.  Finally, the author would like to give special 
thanks to Chief Production Editor Jenna Spatz and the rest of the editors and staffers of the Loyo-
la of Los Angeles Entertainment Law Review for their tireless efforts and help in making this pub-
lication possible. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Baseball is America’s sport.1  A classic form of entertainment, base-
ball provides daily drama and culminates in the World Series—the “Fall 
Classic.”2  Baseball thrives because millions of fans “can open up the 
sports page, digest the box scores, and learn whether their team triumphed 
or failed the night before.”3 
However, baseball is more than a game; it is a business.4  Like any 
other business, baseball teams can reap great profits or falter into bankrupt-
cy.5  When a club files for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, Major League Baseball 
(“MLB”) must confront the intricacies of that bankruptcy.6  However, re-
sorting to bankruptcy is a relatively rare occurrence in professional sports.7  
Recently, the Los Angeles Dodgers became baseball’s third team in 
three years to file for bankruptcy.8  Although MLB supported the bankrupt-
cy filings of the Chicago Cubs and the Texas Rangers, it did not support the 
Dodgers’ bankruptcy.9  When the Dodgers filed for bankruptcy on June 27, 
2011,10 Frank McCourt, the Dodgers’ owner, and MLB were locked in a 
highly publicized public dispute for ultimate control over the Dodgers,11  
the third most valuable team in baseball.12 
 
1. See generally Andrew P. Hanson, The Trend Toward Principled Negotiation in Major 
League Baseball Collective Bargaining, 15 SPORTS LAW. J. 221, 221 (2008). 
2. See World Series Overview, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/postseason/ 
mlb_ws.jsp (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
3. Hanson, supra note 1, at 221.  
4. SCOTT R. ROSNER & KENNETH L. SHROPSHIRE, THE BUSINESS OF SPORTS xi (Scott R. 
Rosner & Kenneth Shropshire eds., 2d ed. 2011). 
5. Ralph C. Anzivinio, Reorganization of the Professional Sports Franchise, 12 MARQ. 
SPORTS L. REV. 9, 9–10 (2001). 
6. Id. 
7. Dodgers Just Latest Team to File for Bankruptcy, YAHOO! SPORTS (June 28, 2011), 
http://sports.yahoo.com/top/news?slug=ys-cnbc_dodgers_not_first_bankrupty_team_062811. 
8. Tom Hals, Dodgers Win Court Approval for $60 Mln Bankruptcy Loan, REUTERS (June 
28, 2011), http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/06/28/losangelesdodgers-bankruptcy-idUSN1E 
75R06120110628.  
9. Maury Brown, Sizing Up the Dodgers Bankruptcy to the Cubs, Rangers, and Coyotes, 
THE BIZ OF BASEBALL (June 28, 2011), http://bizofbaseball.com/index.php?view=article& 
catid=26%3Aeditorials&id=5301%3Asizing-up-the-dodgers-bankruptcy-to-the-cubs-rangers-and-
coyotes&tmpl=component&print=1&layout=default&page=&option=com_content&Itemid=39. 
10. Voluntary Petition, In re:  Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, No. 11-12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. 
Del. 2011).  
11. Eryn Doherty, The Dodger Debacle, MARQ. U. L. SCH. FACULTY BLOG (Aug. 18, 
2011), http://law.marquette.edu/facultyblog/2011/08/18/the-dodgers-debacle/. 
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12McCourt alleged the Dodgers were forced to file for bankruptcy after 
Commissioner Allan “Bud” Selig refused to approve an approximately $3 
billion telecast agreement that McCourt needed to meet payroll and other 
financial obligations.13  However, Commissioner Selig contended that the 
bankruptcy filing “does nothing but inflict harm to this historic fran-
chise.”14  McCourt expected the bankruptcy to allow him to obtain tempo-
rary financing to meet payroll and other obligations and retain control of 
the team.15  McCourt also anticipated the bankruptcy would allow him to 
sell the television rights to the highest bidder and, in the process, override 
MLB rules governing the clubs, including the Dodgers.16 
Typically, bankruptcy allows the debtor sports club to alter certain con-
tractual rights and to restructure its operations to avert the financial crisis that 
precipitated the bankruptcy filing.17  However, professional sports leagues 
have pre-existing contractual rights and remedies in place for the benefit and 
protection of all member teams, and the leagues try to enforce those rights, 
even in the bankruptcy arena.18  For example, in professional baseball, MLB 
is governed by a constitution, an “agreement” among MLB clubs.19  Like 
other professional sports leagues’ constitutions (e.g., National Football 
League20 and National Hockey League21), the MLB Constitution contains 
rules governing the sale, transfer, or assignment of ownership interests in the 
teams,22 and other important approval and consent provisions.23 
 
12. Full List:  Baseball’s Most Valuable Teams, FORBES, http://www.forbes.com/2011/03/ 
22/mets-yankees-phillies-dodgers-baseball-valuations_slide_4.html (last visited Nov. 26, 2012).  
In March 2011, Forbes ranked the Dodgers as baseball’s third most valuable team, at $800 mil-
lion, with only the New York Yankees and Boston Red Sox worth more.  Id.  
13. Bill Shaikin, In Filing for Bankruptcy, Dodgers Will Ask Judge to Override MLB Rules, 
L.A. TIMES (June 27, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/27/sports/la-sp-dodgers-
bankruptcy-20110628. 
14. Commissioner Allan H. (Bud) Selig, MLB Statement Regarding Dodgers Chapters 11 
Filing, MLB (June 27, 2011), http://mlb.mlb.com/content/printer_friendly/mlb/y2011/m06/d27/ 
c21076822.jsp. 
15. Shaikin, supra note 13. 
16. Id. 
17. Anzivinio, supra note 5, at 10–11. 
18. Id. at 29. 
19. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. I (2005), available at http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/ML 
ConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf. 
20. NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE CONST. art. III § 3.5 (2006), available at http://static.nfl 
.com/static/content//public/static/html/careers/pdf/co_.pdf. 
21. NAT’L HOCKEY LEAGUE CONST. art. III § 3.5, available at http://www.bizofhockey.com 
/docs/NHLConsitution.pdf. 
22. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. V, § 2(b)(2). 
23. Id. § 2(a). 
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However, the “constitutional rights” guaranteed by MLB may conflict 
with bankruptcy laws, which are supposed to afford the debtor the right to 
free itself from onerous contracts, leases, restrictive covenants, and other 
obligations.24  The Dodgers’ bankruptcy filing represents the most recent 
example of this clash between bankruptcy law and professional sports.25  
The fundamental debate centers on who should win and who should lose 
the game when the parties enter the “bankruptcy” arena.26 
This comment will address the extent to which MLB teams can make 
material business decisions affecting their Chapter 11 reorganization with-
out complying with the terms of the MLB Constitution and associated regu-
lations.27  These competing interests are at the forefront of all contested 
sports team bankruptcies.28  The Dodgers’ bankruptcy provides a classic 
case study of the clash between a debtor team’s rights in bankruptcy and 
MLB’s existing “constitutional” rights.29  Although MLB and the Dodgers 
have settled their differences,30 the legal issues addressed in this bankrupt-
cy case are likely to recur in other sports team bankruptcies as other teams 
face economic problems.31  Also, recurrence is likely because the law is 
unsettled and each side can present persuasive arguments.32 
Section II of this comment will summarize MLB’s structure and high-
light prior sports team bankruptcies.  Section III will evaluate the events 
that led to the Dodgers’ bankruptcy filing, and Section IV will provide an 
overview of bankruptcy reorganization.  Section V will address the bank-
ruptcy issues raised in the Dodgers bankruptcy, but are likely to reoccur in 
other future sports team bankruptcies.  The section will analyze whether the 
 
24. See generally Anzivinio, supra note 5, at 28–36. 
25. See generally Alicia Jessop, For the Love of The Game:  Why “The Game” Prevents 
MLB’s Takeover of The Dodgers, RULING SPORTS:  A SPORTS L. BLOG (July 6, 2011, 12:13 
AM), http://rulingsports.com/2011/07/06/for-the-love-of-the-game-why-the-game-presents-a-
challenge-to-mlb-overtaking-dodgers. 
26. Jeffrey I. Golden & Robert S. Marticello, Sports Team Bankruptcies:  Home Runs or 
Strikeouts?, L.A. DAILY J., Aug. 11, 2011, at 3.  
27. Id. 
28. Id. 
29. Id. 
30. Debtors’ Motion for Order, Pursuant to Sections 363(b) and 105(a) of the Bankruptcy 
Code and Bankruptcy Rule 9019, Approving Settlement Agreement with the Office of the Com-
missioner of Baseball, Doing Business as Major League Baseball at ¶ 1, In re:  Los Angeles 
Dodgers LLC, No. 11–12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 6, 2011), 2011 WL 6057895. 
31. For example, the New York Mets lost $70 million in 2011 and cut payroll by $52 mil-
lion in 2012 due to mounting liabilities and cash-strapped ownership.  Bill Shaikin, Steven Cohen, 
Dodgers Bidder, May Buy a Piece of the Mets, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 1, 2012), http://articles. 
latimes.com/print/2012/feb/01/sports/la-sp-0202-dodgers-steve-cohen-20120202.  
32. Golden & Marticello, supra note 26. 
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debtor sports team can assume or assign league and other agreements if the 
team is in incurable breach of those agreements.  In addition, it will discuss 
whether MLB’s consent is required as a predicate to the assumption or as-
signment of such agreements.  Compliance with such agreements is the 
very foundation of a debtor sports team’s ability to reorganize successfully 
and continue to operate the team as a member of the league.  Finally, this 
Comment will discuss whether MLB can terminate a team from the league 
for filing bankruptcy, or whether termination on such grounds would con-
stitute an unenforceable ipso facto clause. 
II.  THE STRUCTURE OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL AND  
TEAM BANKRUPTCIES 
Professional baseball is one of America’s oldest organized league 
sports, which dates back to 1869.33  Every year, “[f]rom April through Oc-
tober . . . , [Major League Baseball (“MLB”)] runs a 162-game regular sea-
son and a post-season playoff that determines that season’s World Series 
Champion.  [MLB] teams are divided into two leagues (American and Na-
tional) and six divisions ([American League East, Central, and West; and 
National League East, Central, and West]).”34  Doing business as “MLB,” 
the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball is an unincorporated associa-
tion of its thirty member clubs.35  MLB’s primary purpose is to undertake 
centralized activities on behalf of the thirty clubs.36 
A.  Historical Overview 
Since the beginning of professional baseball in the mid-nineteenth 
century, the game has been governed by an associational structure.37  The 
first structure, the “National Association of Base Ball Players,” created a 
National Commission, consisting of a three-person body with supervisory 
control of professional baseball.38  The National Association, a loose as-
semblage of players, was ineffective at controlling the gambling and brib-
 
33. Objection of Major League Baseball to Debtors’ Motion to Obtain Post-Petition Financ-
ing and for Related Relief at 5, In re:  Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, No. 11–12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. 
Del. June 28, 2011), 2011 WL 2678238 [hereinafter Objection of Major League Baseball]. 
34. Id. 
35. Id. 
36. Id. at 5–6. 
37. The Commissionership:  A Historical Perspective, MLB.COM, http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/ 
history/mlb_history_people.jsp?story=com (last visited Nov. 26, 2012). 
38. Id. 
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ery that became widespread in baseball; therefore, it was replaced by the 
“National League of Professional Base Ball Clubs” (“National League”).39 
The National League was set apart from the National Association be-
cause it was an organization of baseball clubs, rather than a players’ associ-
ation.40  Although the National League was still maintained by a group of 
committees, a group of five directors had most of the administrative pow-
er.41  Shortly after formation of the National League, other leagues were 
formed, which resulted in increased competition amongst the teams for 
players.42  To control the appropriation of players from league to league, 
the three major leagues committed to the “Triparte Agreement,” later re-
named the “National Agreement,” which served as the “central law” of the 
three-league system.43 
The 1919 Black Sox scandal led to the demise of baseball’s initial 
structure.44  In response, the National League proposed to eliminate the Na-
tional Commission and replace it with “one leader, a man ‘of unquestiona-
ble reputation and standing in fields other than baseball’ whose ‘mere pres-
ence would assure that public interest would first be served, and that 
therefore, as a natural sequence, all existing evils would disappear.’”45  On 
January 12, 1921, “the position of Baseball Commissioner was created . . . 
with the ratification of the new Major League Agreement.”46  Baseball’s 
first Commissioner was United States District Court Judge Kenesaw Moun-
tain Landis, who served as a Commissioner for twenty-four years, the long-
est tenure of any Commissioner to date.47  The current baseball commis-
sioner is Allan H. “Bud” Selig.48 
B.  The Major League Constitution 
Originally adopted as the Major League Agreement of 1921, the MLB 
Constitution entitles each club to the benefits of the Constitution, but also 
 
39. Id. 
40. Id. 
41. Id. 
42. Id. 
43. The Commissionership:  A Historical Perspective, supra note 37. 
44. Id.  Eight players from the Chicago White Sox allegedly took bribes to intentionally lose 
the 1919 World Series against the Cincinnati Reds.  Id. 
45. Id.   
46. Id. 
47. Commissioner, BASEBALL-REFERENCE, http://www.baseball-reference.com/bullpen/ 
Commissioner (last modified Feb. 9, 2010). 
48. Id. 
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binds each club to its terms and provisions.49  For example, Article VIII 
specifies the thirty-team membership and requires its members to “act at all 
times in the best interests of Baseball.”50 
Article II establishes the Office of the Commissioner of Baseball.51  
The Commissioner’s functions include serving as the “Chief Executive Of-
ficer” and investigating “any act, transaction or practice” alleged or sus-
pected “to be not in the best interests” of baseball.52  With the appropriate 
vote of the MLB clubs, the Commissioner may take “punitive action” to 
correct offenses deemed not to be in the “best interests” of baseball.53  The 
penalties range from a reprimand or a fine to removal of “any owner, of-
ficer or employee of a Major League Club.”54 
The Commissioner’s powers and remedial measures are extremely 
broad and extend to “such other actions as the Commissioner may deem ap-
propriate.”55  The “best interests of baseball” clause authorizes the Commis-
sioner to protect and regulate the conduct of each MLB club so that each 
club operates in the best interests of baseball, baseball fans, and sponsors.56  
Furthermore, this clause protects the integrity of the game.57  Specifically, 
the Commissioner’s authority extends to “any matter that involves the integ-
rity of, or public confidence in, the national game of Baseball.”58 
Importantly, each club has agreed to act in the “best interests of base-
ball” as required by the MLB Constitution.59  The Constitution’s “Super-
seding Effect” clause provides as follows: 
This Constitution, and all actions taken pursuant to this Consti-
tution, shall supersede any conflicting provisions of any other 
agreement, as amended, whether now existing or hereinafter en-
 
49. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. I (2005), available at http://bizofbaseball.com/docs/ML 
ConsititutionJune2005Update.pdf.  
50. Id. at art. VIII, § 1. 
51. Id. at art. II, § 1. 
52. Id. at art. II, § 2; see Atlanta Nat’l League Baseball Club, Inc. v. Kuhn, 432 F. Supp. 
1213, 1220–21 (N.D. Ga. 1977) (relying on the “best interests clause” to suspend an owner for 
tampering with a potential free agent). 
53. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. II, § 3. 
54. Id. at art. II, § 3(a)–(g). 
55. Id. at art. II, § 3(g). 
56. Objection of Major League Baseball, supra note 33, at 4. 
57. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. II, § 4. 
58. Id. 
59. Id. at art. VIII, § 1. 
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tered into, to which any Major League Club is a party and any 
conflicting actions taken pursuant thereto.60 
Moreover, the MLB Constitution addresses the issue of the “involun-
tary termination” of a club.61  With the approval of three-fourths of all 
MLB clubs, the “rights, privileges, and other property rights of a Major 
League Club” may be terminated involuntarily “if the Club in question 
shall do or suffer” certain specified conditions.62  The most important of 
these “involuntary termination” conditions include the following: 
(f) Fail or refuse to comply with any requirement of the Com-
missioner; . . . 
(j) Fail or refuse to fulfill its contractual obligations; . . . or 
(l) [F]ile a voluntary petition in bankruptcy . . . or if reorgani-
zation proceedings in bankruptcy are instituted by or against 
the Club.63 
The MLB Constitution also contains rules governing the sale or trans-
fer of control interests in each club, which often are at the heart of sports 
teams’ bankruptcies.64 
C.  Professional Sports Team Bankruptcies 
Although uncommon, professional sports teams occasionally file for 
bankruptcy.65  The financial viability of a professional sports team is driven 
by a complex combination of revenues and expenses:  (a) ticket sales; (b) 
broadcast media revenue; (c) venue revenues; (d) license revenues; (e) 
naming rights revenues; (f) concessions; (g) player costs; (h) venue costs; 
and (i) operating expenses.66  Teams are typically forced into bankruptcy 
due to huge debt, bad investments, or the financial hardship of the owner’s 
primary business.67  When a default in significant financing is imminent,68 
 
60. Id. at art. VII (emphasis added). 
61. Id. at art. VIII, § 4. 
62. Id. 
63. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 4(f), (j), (l).  Due to the Dodgers’ bankruptcy filing, 
Article VIII of the Major League Constitution allows MLB, acting through its Commissioner, to 
eject the Dodgers from the league, with the approval of three-fourths of all major league clubs.  
Id. (examining the legal permissibility of such an expulsion). 
64. Id. at art. V, § 2(b)(2).  In the Dodgers’ bankruptcy, MLB’s refusal to approve a new 
agreement between the Dodgers and Fox Sports Net West 2, LLC (“Fox Sports”) for the sale of 
telecast rights was one of the alleged reasons for the Dodgers’ bankruptcy filing.  See In re:  Los 
Angeles Dodgers LLC, No. 11–12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 15, 2011), 2011 WL 6257336.  
65. Dodgers Just Latest Team to File for Bankruptcy, supra note 7. 
66. Anzivino, supra note 5. 
67. Dodgers Just Latest Team to File for Bankruptcy, supra note 7. 
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or when expenses exceed revenues, a Chapter 11 reorganization becomes 
an option.69  Of the nine professional teams that have filed for bankruptcy 
in the past forty years (with the Pittsburgh Penguins filing twice), six are 
National Hockey League teams and three are MLB teams.70  Over that 
time, the bankruptcies did not lead to a forfeiture or dissolution of the 
sports team, but rather resulted in a shift in ownership.71 
In contrast, in the Dodger’s bankruptcy, MLB has taken the position 
that the Dodgers, as debtors, should be compelled to abide by the MLB 
Constitution and other baseball agreements or reject them and effectively 
terminate the debtors’ rights to the team.72  This approach is at odds with 
other MLB bankruptcies.  For example, MLB’s Seattle Pilots played one 
season in Seattle, but the owners did not have sufficient funds to continue 
operating the team.73  As a result, in March 1970, the owners filed for 
bankruptcy after a state court granted the State of Washington an injunction 
to prevent the owners from relocating the team.74  Placing the team into 
bankruptcy allowed the approximately $10 million sale of the team to Bud 
Selig, the current MLB Commissioner.75  The sale took place in time for 
the 1970 season.76  The team later relocated to Milwaukee77 and was re-
named the “Milwaukee Brewers” as a result of the bankruptcy.78 
Second, in 1989, Eli Jacobs led a group that purchased the Baltimore 
Orioles for $70 million.79  In 1992, the Baltimore Orioles opened the sea-
son in Camden Yards, the first of the “retro” ballparks.80  However, even 
 
68. Anzivino, supra note 5, at 14. 
69. Id. at 63–64. 
70. Dodgers Just Latest Team to File for Bankruptcy, supra note 7; Brown, supra note 9; 
Darren Rovell, 10 Sports Franchises That Have Gone Bankrupt, CNBC (June 28, 2011), 
http://www.cnbc.com/id/39915632?__source=yahoosports&par=yahoosports. 
71. Dodgers Just Latest Team to File for Bankruptcy, supra note 7. 
72. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity or, in the Alternative, to Com-
pel the Debtors to Seek Assumption or Rejection of the Baseball Agreements at 23, In re:  Los An-
geles Dodgers LLC, No. 11–12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 7, 2011), 2011 WL 4945134. 
73. Ten Franchises that Filed for Bankruptcy:  Seattle Pilots—1970, REAL CLEAR SPORTS 
(Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.realclearsports.com/lists/franchise_bankruptcy/seattle_pilots_ 
1970.html. 
74. Dodgers Just Latest Team to File for Bankruptcy, supra note 7. 
75. Id. 
76. Id. 
77. Id. 
78. Id. 
79. Ten Franchises that Filed for Bankruptcy:  Baltimore Orioles—1993, REAL CLEAR 
SPORTS (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.realclearsports.com/lists/franchise_bankruptcy/baltimore_ 
orioles_1993.html. 
80. Rovell, supra note 70. 
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with consistent attendance,81 Eli Jacobs filed for bankruptcy in his other 
primary business venture, Memorex Telex, and was forced into bankruptcy 
in March 1993.82  During the bankruptcy, the Orioles were sold at auction 
with MLB’s approval to lawyer Peter Angelos, who paid $173 million.83 
Third, in 2009, the Tribune Company placed the Chicago Cubs into 
bankruptcy as a technical maneuver to help expedite the sale of the team, 
which was approved by the Tribune’s creditors.84  The sale received 
MLB’s approval as well.85 
Finally, in 2010, Texas Rangers’ owner Tom Hicks incurred over 
$500 million in debt and defaulted, which caused chaos.86  To raise 
funds, Hicks agreed to sell the team to Nolan Ryan and attorney Chuck 
Greenberg for $525 million.87  However, when the creditors did not ap-
prove the sale, the Texas Rangers filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy.88  In 
an August 2010 auction, Ryan and Greenberg purchased the team for a 
reported $593 million, after besting Dallas Mavericks owner Mark Cu-
ban and others.89  In that bankruptcy, “the court was presented with, but 
did not ultimately resolve, the issue of whether the debtor could sell the 
team to a lower bidder because [MLB] had approved that bidder.”90  
However, the court implied that the debtor could not sell the team with-
out the league’s approval, provided the league exercised its approval 
rights in good faith.91  While the Texas Rangers’ bankruptcy was conten-
tious, it did not compare to the “tangled web” surrounding the Los Ange-
les Dodgers’ Chapter 11 bankruptcy.92 
 
81. Id. 
82. Ten Franchises That Filed for Bankruptcy:  Baltimore Orioles—1993, supra note 79. 
83. Id. 
84. Brown, supra note 9.  
85. See Steven Church, Cubs File Bankruptcy, Plan Sale to Ricketts Family (Update3), 
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 12, 2009), http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid= 
a7Piey9m.a7g.  
86. See Brown, supra note 9.  
87. Dodgers Just Latest Team to File for Bankruptcy, supra note 7. 
88. In re Texas Rangers Baseball Partners, 434 B.R. 393, 399 (Bankr. N.D.Tex. 2010).  
89. Dodgers Just Latest Team to File for Bankruptcy, supra note 7. 
90. Golden & Marticello, supra note 26. 
91. Id. 
92. Mark Harriman, Dodgers Bankruptcy:  A Tangled Web Woven, BOS. SPORTS DESK (July 
10, 2011), http://bostonsportsdesk.wordpress.com/2011/07/10/dodgers-bankruptcy-a-tangled-
web-woven. 
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III.  THE LOS ANGELES DODGERS CALAMITY 
The well publicized calamity associated with the Los Angeles 
Dodgers began with the Frank McCourt acquisition of the team in 2004 
and culminated in a hotly disputed bankruptcy in 2011, with accusations 
of wrong-doing by both McCourt and Major League Baseball 
(“MLB”).93  The dispute has forced both sides to raise legal issues not 
yet answered in the context of professional sports team bankruptcies.94  
To provide context for the legal issues presented in the Dodgers’ bank-
ruptcy, some background is needed of the team, the McCourt acquisi-
tion, the messy divorce that spotlighted the McCourt financial woes, and 
the bankruptcy filing.95 
A.  The Los Angeles Dodgers 
The Los Angeles Dodgers, located in the second most populous 
metropolitan area in the United States, is one of only thirty MLB clubs 
and one of three clubs in southern California.96  The Dodgers have a sto-
ried history,97 which dates back to the late 1800s.98  In 1947, the Dodg-
ers broke baseball’s color barrier by hiring Jackie Robinson, the first 
African American Major League Baseball player.99  The Dodgers won 
their first World Series Championship in 1955.100  In 1962, the Dodgers 
moved from New York to their new home at Dodger Stadium, located in 
Chavez Ravine, Los Angeles, where they continue to play.101  The 
Dodgers have won six World Series Championships (five in Los Ange-
 
93. See Houston Mitchell, Frank McCourt and the Dodgers:  A Chronology, L.A. TIMES 
(June 27, 2011), http://articles.latimes.com/2011/jun/27/sports/la-sp-0628-mccourt-chronology-
20110628. 
94. Golden & Marticello, supra note 26. 
95. See generally Jessop, supra note 25. 
96. Objection of Major League Baseball, supra note 33, at 6. 
97. U.S. Bankruptcy Judge Kevin Gross, who presided over the Los Angeles Dodgers’ 
bankruptcy, described the Dodgers’ history as “rich and successful” and “of mythical propor-
tions.”  Judge Gross captured that history:  “Its great former players, managers and executives 
could justify their own hall of fame.  Formerly the Brooklyn Dodgers, the team name is derived 
from fans who used to ‘dodge’ that city’s trolleys.”  Voluntary Petition, In re:  Los Angeles 
Dodgers LLC, No. 11–12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. 2011).  
98. Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram in Support of Debtors’ Chapter 11 Petitions and First 
Day Motions at 4, Voluntary Petition, In re:  Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, No. 11–12010 (KG) 
(Bankr. D. Del. June 27, 2011).  
99. Id. 
100. Objection of Major League Baseball, supra note 33, at 6. 
101. Id. 
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les).102  The Dodgers’ most recent World Series championship occurred 
in 1988.103 
In 1998, Fox Sports purchased the Dodgers and created a regional 
sports network.104  Thereafter, in November 2001, the Dodgers and Fox 
Sports entered into a Telecast Rights Agreement.105  In 2003, Fox Sports 
decided to sell the team along with the surrounding real estate (stadium and 
parking lots), and in early 2004, McCourt purchased the Dodgers and the 
associated real estate.106  In connection with the purchase, Fox Sports and 
McCourt agreed to an amendment to the Telecast Rights Agreement.107  
Under the amended agreement, the term of the Telecast Rights Agreement 
was extended to grant Fox Sports the right to telecast Dodger games 
through the 2013 season.108  Furthermore, Fox Sports received an exclusive 
renegotiation right for an additional five-year term, with negotiations to 
take place from October 15 to November 30, 2012.109  Fox also received a 
right of first refusal as to third-party offers.110 
B.  2004:  The McCourt Era 
In February 2004, Frank McCourt acquired the Dodgers and associat-
ed real estate from Fox Sports for $430 million.111  MLB unanimously ap-
proved the sale to McCourt;112 however, the acquisition of the team was 
based almost wholly on borrowed funds.113  Further, there were important 
conditions to the acquisition.  First, McCourt and the Dodgers were re-
quired to acknowledge their obligation to comply with all the terms and 
 
102. Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram, supra note 98. 
103. Id.  Kirk Gibson’s two-run home run in the ninth inning of the first game of the 1988 
World Series is an indelible memory from that World Series.  World Series Summary, MLB, 
http://mlb.mlb.com/mlb/history/postseason/mlb_ws.jsp (last visited Apr. 22, 2012).   
104. Memorandum Opinion at 2, Voluntary Petition, In re:  Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, et 
al., No. 11-12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 15, 2011). 
105. Id. 
106. Id. 
107. Id. 
108. Id. 
109. Id. 
110. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 104, at 2. 
 111.  Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram, supra note 98. 
112. Id. 
113. Objection of Major League Baseball to Final Approval of Debtors’ Emergency Motion 
for Interim and Final Orders (I) Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post Petition Financing, Pursuant 
to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 362, and 364, and (II) Scheduling Final Hearing Pursuant to Bankruptcy 
Rules 4001(B) and 4001(c) at 8, Voluntary Petition, In re:  Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, et al., No. 
11–12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. July 14, 2011). 
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conditions imposed by MLB, including the MLB Constitution and other 
rules and regulations.114  Second, MLB “required that Mr. McCourt agree 
to provide an additional $30 million in liquid equity within three years [of 
acquisition] through the sale of certain real estate assets or by securing eq-
uity investors.”115 
Under the McCourt ownership, the Dodgers performed well.116  For 
example, in 2004, the Dodgers won their first playoff game in several 
years, and in both 2008 and 2009, the team advanced to National League 
Championship Series games for the first time in several decades.117  How-
ever, on October 14, 2009, while the Dodgers entered into its second 
championship series, Frank and Jamie McCourt announced their separation 
after thirty years of marriage.118  A few days later, Frank McCourt claimed 
he owned one hundred percent of the team; Jamie claimed otherwise, stat-
ing she held a fifty percent ownership interest.119  On October 22, 2009, 
Frank McCourt fired his wife as the Chief Executive Officer of the Dodg-
ers.120  This action triggered Commissioner Bud Selig to announce that the 
league would track the McCourts’ ongoing and much publicized dispute.121  
Shortly thereafter, on October 27, 2009, Jamie McCourt filed for divorce 
and spousal support.122 
In May 2010, the divorce court ordered McCourt to pay Jamie 
$640,000 per month in support, including $225,000 in spousal support, and 
$412,159 per month for costs associated with their real property.123  Over-
all, McCourt was ordered to pay more than $7.6 million per year.124  To 
cover the spousal support and other financial obligations, McCourt entered 
into a proposed transaction with Fox Sports, which involved the sale of the 
 
114. Id. at 7–8. 
115. Id. at 8. 
116. See Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram, supra note 98, at 6. 
117. Id. 
118. Helene Elliot & Bill Shaikin, Dodgers Owner Frank McCourt, Wife Jamie Separate, 
L.A. TIMES (Oct. 15, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/15/sports/sp-mccourts15. 
119. Mitchell, supra note 93. 
120. Jessop, supra note 25. 
121. Id. 
122. Order to Show Cause to Modify Pendente Lite Spousal Support, In re Marriage of 
McCourt, No. BD 514309 (Cal. Super. Ct. Oct. 27, 2009). 
123. Court’s Ruling on Submitted Matter at 44–45, McCourt v. McCourt, No. BD514309 
(Cal. Super. Ct. May 7, 2010), 2010 WL 1848207. 
124. See id. 
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Dodgers’ future telecast rights.125  The transaction was reportedly valued at 
about $1.7 billion in telecast fees,126 but also involved Fox Sports making a 
$385 million loan to one of the McCourt-owned entities to pay for the pro-
posed divorce settlement and to satisfy other financial obligations.127 
The telecast rights transaction was subject to MLB approval and re-
quired the consent of Jamie McCourt due to her claimed ownership interest 
in the Dodgers and related assets.128  Moreover, if MLB did not approve the 
proposed Fox transaction, it would be “null and void.”129  Jamie McCourt 
consented to the proposed Fox transaction130 but MLB did not immediately 
respond to McCourt’s request for approval.131 
Meanwhile, the divorce proceedings exposed the McCourts’ lavish 
lifestyle and use of Dodgers funds for personal purposes.132  On December 
7, 2010, the court invalidated the post-nuptial marital agreement that Frank 
McCourt had claimed provided him with sole ownership of the Dodgers.133  
The divorce left McCourt financially distressed and exposed him to a po-
tential loss of fifty percent of the team and its assets.134 
Additionally, at the beginning of the 2011 season, a violent fight oc-
curred at Dodger Stadium.135  A San Francisco Giants fan, Bryan Stow, 
was attacked in the Dodger Stadium parking lot after the Dodgers’ opening 
day game.136  As a result, Stow was in a coma for several weeks and suf-
fered brain damage, raising the prospect of a suit for substantial damag-
es.137  On April 20, 2011, Commissioner Selig announced that he would 
appoint a monitor to oversee the Dodgers’ day-to-day operations, effective-
ly taking control of the team from McCourt.138 
 
125. Marie-Andrée Weiss, Take Me Out to the Courts:  The Los Angeles Dodgers File For 
Bankruptcy, ENT., ARTS & SPORTS L. BLOG (July 1, 2011, 8:24 AM), http://nysbar.com/blogs/ 
EASL/2011/07/take_me_out_to_the_courts_the.html. 
126. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 23–24. 
127. See Binding Term Sheet at 1, In re Marriage of McCourt, No. BD 514309 (Cal. Super. 
Ct. Jun. 17, 2011), 2011 WL 2420345.  
128. See id. at 1–2. 
129. Id. at 1. 
130. Id. at 4. 
131. Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram, supra note 98, at 11.  
132. Doherty, supra note 11. 
133. Mitchell, supra note 93. 
134. Doherty, supra note 11. 
135. Jessop, supra note 25. 
136. Id. 
137. Doherty, supra note 11. 
138. Mitchell, supra note 93. 
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With attendance down and financial pressures mounting, McCourt 
pushed MLB for its approval of the proposed Fox transaction—a transac-
tion that would bail out McCourt from financial ruin for the time being.139  
However, on June 20, 2011, Commissioner Selig advised McCourt by letter 
that MLB would not approve the proposed Fox transaction.140  Commis-
sioner Selig declined to approve the transaction for multiple reasons, in-
cluding:  (a) McCourt did not obtain other offers for the telecast rights and, 
therefore, did not maximize the value of those rights; (b) the loan advance 
would “hamstring” the Dodgers going forward and would sacrifice the 
Dodgers’ future in exchange for an immediate payoff; (c) a substantial por-
tion of the loan advance would be used to pay for McCourt’s other finan-
cial obligations unrelated to the Dodgers; and (d) it represented a short-
term fix with the Dodgers facing liquidity issues again as early as 2013.141 
C.  2011:  Bankruptcy Filing 
Based on Commissioner Selig’s refusal to approve the proposed Fox 
transaction, the Los Angeles Dodgers LLC did not have sufficient funds to 
meet payroll and other expenses in June 2011.142  Accordingly, on June 27, 
2011, the Los Angeles Dodgers LLC and other debtors143 negotiated a 
debtor-in-possession financing commitment and filed for Chapter 11 bank-
ruptcy.144  In response to the filing, the Bankruptcy Court in Delaware di-
rected the procedural consolidation and joint administration of the Chapter 
11 cases145 and allowed the debtor entities to continue to manage their as-
sets as debtors-in-possession,146 pursuant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of 
the Bankruptcy Code.147 
 
139. Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram, supra note 98, at 8–13. 
140. Order to Show Cause, supra note 121.  
141. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72. 
142. Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram, supra note 98, at 14.  
143. The Debtors are Los Angeles Dodgers LLC; Los Angeles Dodgers Holding Company 
LLC; LA Holdco LLC; LA Real Estate Holding Company LLC; and LA Real Estate LLC.  See 
Order Directing Joint Administration of The Debtors’ Chapter 11 Cases and Granting Related 
Relief, In re:  Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, No. 11–12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Jun. 28, 2011). 
144. Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram, supra note 98, at 14. 
145. Order Directing Joint Administration, supra note 143. 
146. Section 1107 of the Bankruptcy Code allows debtors to remain in control of the business 
entities that file bankruptcy; the debtor-in-possession acts as a fiduciary and must perform the func-
tions and duties of a Chapter 11 trustee, which include accounting for property, examining and ob-
jecting to claims, and filing reports as required by the Bankruptcy Court.  11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2006); 
see also Chapter 11 Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, U.S. COURTS, available at 
http://www.uscourts.gov/FederalCourts/Bankruptcy/BankruptcyBasics/Chapter11.aspx (last viewed 
Nov. 27, 2012). 
147. Objection of Major League Baseball to Final Approval, supra note 113, at 8. 
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Throughout the bankruptcy proceedings, the Dodgers contended that 
the purpose of the bankruptcy was to obtain court permission to hold a 
competitive sale of the Dodgers’ exclusive telecast rights, a move that 
would permit McCourt to maintain control of the team and allow for the 
payment of all outstanding financial obligations.148  To implement the 
McCourt plan, the Dodgers and other debtors filed a motion to establish 
bidding procedures for an auction and sale of the Dodgers’ telecast rights 
under section 363 of the Bankruptcy Code.149 
At issue was whether the McCourt bankruptcy plan required MLB ap-
proval, with MLB having previously rejected the telecast rights transaction 
because it was not “in the best interests of Baseball.”150  Also at issue was 
whether the filing of the bankruptcy itself was a material breach of the MLB 
Constitution, subjecting the Dodgers to possible involuntary termination.151 
The McCourt bankruptcy plan was further complicated because the 
telecast rights were not yet “ripe” for sale.  The current telecast rights with 
Fox Sports152 ran through 2013; therefore, the McCourt plan to sell such 
rights as part of the bankruptcy would arguably breach the Dodgers’ Tele-
cast Rights Agreement with Fox Sports.153  In fact, on September 25, 2011, 
Fox Sports filed suit against the Dodgers in bankruptcy court, alleging the 
team breached the Telecast Rights Agreement by pursuing the competitive 
sale of such rights through bankruptcy.154  In response, Fox Sports sought 
damages for such breach, injunctive relief, and requested that the court re-
ject any such sale except in accordance with the terms and conditions of 
Fox’s existing agreement with the Dodgers.155  According to Fox Sports, 
 
148. Declaration of Jeffrey J. Ingram, supra note 98, at 14.  
149. Los Angeles Dodgers LLC’s Motion for Orders:  (I) Approving Marketing Procedures 
for the Licensing of Telecast Rights, Including the Scheduling of an Auction, Objection Deadline, 
and Disposition Hearing; and (II) Approving and Authorizing the Licensing of Telecast Rights to 
the Highest Bidder, In re:  Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, No. 11–12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 
16, 2011). 
150. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 1–6. 
151. Id. 
152. The Los Angeles Dodgers, LLC is a party to a telecast agreement (“Fox Telecast 
Agreement”) with Fox Sports Net West 2, LLC (“Fox Sports”), under which Fox Sports has been 
granted exclusive television rights until the end of the 2013 baseball season and exclusive negoti-
ation rights through November 30, 2012 for a future long-term telecast agreement.  See id. at 8.  
153. Id. at 9–10. 
154. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Specific Performance, Temporary and Permanent 
Injunctive Relief, Breach of Confidence, Intentional and Negligent Interference with Contract 
Regarding Telecast Rights Agreement and California Business and Professions Code Section 
17200 at 1–2, Fox Sports Net West 2, LLC v. Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, No. 11–12010 (KG) 
(Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 27, 2011), 2011 WL 4469526. 
155. Id. at 11–12. 
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the telecast rights to the Dodgers baseball games are an “inherently unique 
and irreplaceable” asset and business opportunity.156  Further, Fox Sports 
argued the McCourt bankruptcy plan and its timing appeared to be tied to 
McCourt’s proposed divorce settlement payment obligations with his ex-
wife Jamie McCourt.157 
MLB vigorously opposed the bankruptcy filing and contended that 
McCourt was using the bankruptcy as a ploy to avoid preexisting contrac-
tual obligations with MLB and Fox Sports.158  Further, MLB contended 
that McCourt and the debtor entities could not avoid their obligations by 
commencing Chapter 11 bankruptcy and that the Bankruptcy Code did not 
displace MLB’s approval rights under the MLB Constitution and other 
agreements.159  MLB also contended that the sale of the Dodgers’ telecast 
rights without MLB approval would subject one or more of the debtors to 
severe discipline including possible termination from MLB.160 
According to MLB, compliance with the MLB Constitution and other 
agreements was “the price of membership in Major League Baseball.”161  
Further, MLB claimed that the debtor entities cannot “cure” the breaches of 
the MLB Constitution and other agreements or assign or have a third party 
assume those agreements due to material breaches.162  As a result, the 
McCourt bankruptcy plan would result in valueless broadcast rights if the 
Dodgers were terminated from MLB.163 
As a consequence, MLB asserted that the only successful path through 
bankruptcy was the sale of the Dodgers.164  In fact, MLB proposed its own 
reorganization plan for the Dodgers.165  The plan was to request that the 
Bankruptcy Court terminate the exclusive periods during which the debtors 
may file a Chapter 11 reorganization plan.166  The request, if granted, would 
 
156. Id. at 5. 
157. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 4. 
158. Id. at 1–2.  
159. Id. at 4–5. 
160. Id. at 5.  McCourt and the Dodger-related entities disputed MLB’s position, claiming 
the bankruptcy court should make the decisions based on applicable bankruptcy law and not on 
Commissioner approval requirements.  Id.  They also contended that seizing ownership of the 
team was not enforceable under applicable bankruptcy law.  Katie Thomas, Dodgers File for 
Bankruptcy, Increasing Tension With Selig, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 2011, at B15.  
161. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 5–6. 
162. Id. 
163. Id. at 6. 
164. Id. 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 30. 
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allow MLB to file and seek confirmation of the “MLB Plan,” which would 
provide for:  (a) “a competitive auction and sale of the Dodgers to a new 
owner”; (b) payment in full of all allowed bankruptcy claims; and (c) distri-
bution of surplus funds to McCourt and other equity interest holders, “all 
without breaching the Baseball Agreements and the Fox Telecast Rights 
Agreement.”167  Alternatively, MLB requested an order compelling the 
debtors to seek assumption or rejection of the relevant baseball agreements, 
pursuant to Bankruptcy Code section 365(d)(2) and Bankruptcy Rule 
6006.168  The Dodgers countered, asserting that they had the right under the 
bankruptcy laws to seek court approval to sell their future telecast rights.169 
Further, the Dodgers claimed that in Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases, 
“liquidation is the last resort, not the first choice.”170  The Dodgers also ar-
gued that agreements governing MLB’s relationship with the team were “no 
different from other business contracts” and MLB’s interpretation of those 
contracts was not subject to “any greater deference” by the court.171  Fox 
Sports then filed an adversary proceeding in bankruptcy court against the 
Dodger debtors.172  Fox Sports also joined with MLB “in an effort to com-
pel the sale of the Dodgers, pursuant to the MLB Plan.”173  As the parties 
became further entrenched in the struggle over control of the Dodgers, the 
bankruptcy court ordered the parties to mediation.174  As a result, on No-
vember 2, 2011, MLB, McCourt, and the debtors reached a settlement.175 
Approved by the bankruptcy court, the settlement provided for the 
sale of the Dodgers, pursuant to a plan of reorganization, on or before April 
30, 2012.176  In addition, the Dodgers debtors were entitled to seek the sale 
of the telecast rights, subject to the Dodgers filing an amended telecast 
rights motion.177  In that motion, the Dodgers claimed they could obtain a 
higher sale price by marketing their telecast rights without abiding by Fox 
 
167. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 30. 
168. Id. 
169. MLB Seeks Sale of the Dodgers, WORLD BREAKING NEWS, http://uworldnews. 
blogspot.com/2011/09/mlb-seeks-sale-of-dodgers.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2011). 
170.  Id. 
171. Fox Sports Sues Dodgers, ESPN L.A. (Sept. 28, 2011), http://espn.go.com/los-
angeles/mlb/story/_/id/7027852/fox-sports-sues-los-angeles-dodgers-stop-tv-rights-sale. 
172. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 104, at 1. 
173. Id. 
174. Id. at 1–2. 
175. Id. at 2. 
176. Id. 
177. Id. 
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Sports’ exclusive negotiation rights time frames.178  Fox Sports, on the oth-
er hand, asked for enforcement of its contract, which precluded the Dodg-
ers from negotiating with other broadcast entities before the expiration of 
Fox Sports’ exclusive negotiation date of November 30, 2012.179 
The bankruptcy court invalidated Fox Sports’ exclusive renegotiation 
time frame in the telecast agreement.180  The court also granted the Dodg-
ers’ amended motion to market the telecast rights, along with the sale of the 
team.181  Fox Sports promptly appealed the bankruptcy court ruling,182 and 
the U.S. District Court Judge Leonard Stark ruled that the bankruptcy court 
erred in relieving the Dodgers from its contractual obligations under the 
Fox Sports/Dodgers telecast agreement.183  Along with the future telecast 
rights, Judge Stark also stayed the Dodgers’ plans to sell the team.184 
Thereafter, in January 2012, Fox Sports and the Dodgers settled their 
dispute.185  Under the Fox Sports/Dodgers settlement, the Dodgers agreed 
to abandon its proposed sale of the telecast rights and Fox Sports agreed to 
withdraw its objections to the settlement between the Dodgers and MLB.186  
As a result, McCourt could proceed with the sale of the Dodgers pursuant 
to the Dodgers/MLB settlement agreement.187 
IV.  OVERVIEW OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 
Chapter 11 reorganization begins by filing a petition with the bank-
ruptcy court.188  The petition may be voluntarily filed at the election of the 
debtor, or involuntarily filed by creditors to force a debtor into bankrupt-
cy.189  The debtor may file a plan of reorganization with the court.190  Gen-
 
178. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 104, at 4. 
179. Bill Shaikin, Dodgers and Fox Sports Settle Dispute, L.A. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2012), 
http://articles.latimes.com/print/2012/jan/10/sports/la-sp-0111-dodgers-fox-20120111.  
180. Memorandum Opinion, supra note 104, at 8. 
181. Id.  
182. See Fox Sports Net West 2, LLC’s Designation of Items to Be Included on Appeal and 
Statement of Issues on Appeal, In re:  Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, No. 11–12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. 
Del. Dec. 15, 2011). 
183. Judge Explains Dodgers-Fox Decision, ESPN (Dec. 27, 2011), http://espn.go.com/ 
espn/print?id=7393074&type=story.  
184. Id. 
185. Shaikin, supra note 179. 
186. Id. 
187. Id. 
188. 11 U.S.C. §§ 301, 303 (2012). 
189. Id. 
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erally, the debtor has the exclusive right to file the reorganization plan until 
120 days after the petition date or 180 days, if a small business.191  Howev-
er, at the request of a party-in-interest, the bankruptcy court may, for 
“cause,” reduce the debtor’s exclusive time periods for filing a reorganiza-
tion plan.192  In practice, one or more creditors also may seek to file a 
“competing” reorganization plan after the debtor’s exclusivity period has 
expired, or after the “for cause” request has been granted to reduce the 
debtor’s exclusivity rights.193 
Generally, Chapter 11 is used to reorganize a business and allow it to 
continue to manage its property and assets as a debtor-in-possession pursu-
ant to sections 1107(a) and 1108 of the Bankruptcy Code.194  The Office of 
the United States Trustee (“U.S. Trustee”) plays an important role in moni-
toring a Chapter 11 case and supervising its administration, including con-
ducting a meeting of the creditors and appointing the official committee of 
unsecured creditors.195  This committee consults with the debtor-in-
possession, investigates the business and its operations, and participates in 
formulating a reorganization plan.196 
A Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition operates as an automatic stay, sus-
pending all creditor activity associated with any debts or claims arising be-
fore the petition.197  The automatic stay provides the debtor with relief from 
creditor claims and actions, protects property that may be needed for the 
debtor’s “fresh start[,] and provides breathing space to permit the [debtor] 
to focus on its reorganization efforts.”198  “Any action taken in violation of 
the stay is ineffective even if the creditor has no actual knowledge of the 
bankruptcy.”199  The stay’s scope is quite broad and protects virtually any 
type of action against the debtor or its property and assets.200  Only under 
 
190. 11 U.S.C. § 1121 (2012); see Chapter 11 Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, 
supra note 146 (referencing “How Chapter 11 Works” section).  
191. Id. § 1121(b)–(d). 
192. Id. § 1121(d)(1); see also In re Grossinger’s Assoc., 116 B.R. 34, 36 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 
1990) (terminating exclusivity for cause where debtor had not filed a plan with “serious reorgani-
zational possibilities”).  
193. Chapter 11 Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 146.  
194. Id. (referencing “How Chapter 11 Works” and “The Chapter 11 Debtor in Possession” 
sections). 
195. 11 U.S.C. §§ 341, 1102 (2012). 
196. 11 U.S.C. § 1103 (2012). 
197. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
198. Anzivinio, supra note 5, at 24. 
199. Id. 
200. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(1)–(8). 
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specified circumstances can creditors seek a court order granting relief 
from the automatic stay.201 
Once the Chapter 11 bankruptcy petition is filed, a debtor can file 
a motion with the court to receive authorization for post-petition financ-
ing.202  “Oftentimes, post-petition financing is arranged prior to filing 
the bankruptcy petition through negotiations with a pre-petition lend-
er.”203  The purpose of the post-petition financing is to allow the debtor 
“to be able to pay its current operating expenses in order to . . . reorgan-
ize its affairs.”204 
After notice, the court is required to hold a confirmation hearing 
on the reorganization plan.205  A party-in-interest may file an objection 
to the plan’s confirmation.206  Before confirmation, the court must be 
satisfied that the plan is in compliance with all applicable requirements, 
even in the absence of any objections.207  “[T]o confirm the plan, the 
court must find, among other things, that:  (1) the plan is feasible; (2) it 
is proposed in good faith; and (3) the plan and the proponent of the plan 
are in compliance with the Bankruptcy Code.”208  To satisfy the feasibil-
ity requirement, the court must find that the plan confirmation is not 
likely to be followed by liquidation or the need for further financial re-
organization.209  Once the plan is confirmed, and after any post-
confirmation modifications and administration, a final decree closing 
the case must be entered by the court, declaring that the case has been 
“fully administered.”210 
 
201. See id. § 362(d)(1). 
202. 11 U.S.C. § 364 (2012). 
203. Anzivinio, supra note 5, at 19. 
204. Id. 
205. 11 U.S.C. § 1128(a) (2012); FED. R. BANKR. P. 3020(b). 
206. 11 U.S.C. § 1128(b). 
207. 11 U.S.C. § 1129 (2012). 
208. Chapter 11 Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 146 (referencing 
“Acceptance of the Plan of Reorganization” section); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1129. 
209.  Chapter 11 Reorganization Under the Bankruptcy Code, supra note 146; see also 11 
U.S.C. § 1129. 
210. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3022. 
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V.  BANKRUPTCY ISSUES ARISING FROM  
PROFESSIONAL SPORTS TEAM BANKRUPTCIES 
A.  Can the Debtor Sports Team Assume or Assign the League Agreements 
if the Debtor Is in Breach and Cannot Cure the Breach? 
Before an executory contract may be assumed or assigned, the debtor 
must cure all defaults under that contract or provide adequate assurance 
that all such defaults will be cured.211  The ability of the debtor to cure the 
default is particularly important in a professional sports team bankruptcy 
because a successful reorganization requires the team to assume or assign 
key agreements with the league.212  An incurable breach of the league 
agreements would render them non-assumable in sports team bankrupt-
cies.213  The practical effect of non-assignment of such agreements is the 
“death knell” of the team.214 
For example, in the Dodgers’ bankruptcy case, Major League Base-
ball (“MLB”) claimed it would be futile to allow the Dodgers to sell the 
team’s future telecast rights, because the sale of such rights over the objec-
tion of MLB would breach the League Agreements, precluding the assump-
tion or assignment of those agreements.215  Further, MLB claimed that its 
approval was required by the League Agreements, citing the MLB Consti-
tution, which requires a vote of three-fourths of the MLB Clubs to approve 
“the sale or transfer of a control interest in any Club.”216 
Additionally, MLB claimed that consummating the sale of the Dodgers’ 
future telecast rights would result in an incurable breach of the Fox 
Sports/Dodgers telecast rights agreement.217  Relying again on the MLB Con-
stitution, MLB asserted that the Dodgers’ breach of the Fox Sports/Dodgers 
telecast rights agreement provided grounds for involuntary termination because 
the Dodgers, as an MLB club, failed or refused to “fulfill its contractual obliga-
tions.”218  According to MLB, the Dodgers’ proposed sale of its future telecast 
 
211. 11 U.S.C. § 365(b)(1)(A) (2012). 
212. Anzivinio, supra note 5, at 31. 
213. Id. 
214. Id. 
215. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 62. 
216. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. V, § 2(b)(2) (2005); see Motion of Major League Baseball 
to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 62. 
217. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 62. 
218. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 4(j); see also Motion of Major League Baseball to 
Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 62. 
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rights would violate Fox Sports’ exclusive negotiation provisions of the exist-
ing Fox Sports/Dodgers telecast rights agreement.219 
Moreover, MLB argued that McCourt and the Dodgers committed 
other incurable breaches precluding the assumption and assignment of the 
League Agreements without MLB’s consent.220  Specifically, MLB 
claimed that McCourt and the Dodgers failed to act in the best interests of 
baseball and breached the team’s obligations under the League Agreements 
when McCourt (a) siphoned over $100 million from the Club “to fund per-
sonal and business obligations unrelated to the business of baseball, leaving 
the club insufficiently capitalized and ultimately in need of bankruptcy pro-
tection”; (b) failed to disclose and obtain MLB approval for loans secured 
by the Club in violation of the League Agreements; (c) failed to comply 
with the condition, at purchase, to make an additional $30 million liquid 
equity contribution to the Dodgers; (d) refused to comply with the Com-
missioner’s 2011 Directive to appoint a monitor to oversee day-to-day op-
erations of the Dodgers; (e) filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy without 
the approval of the Monitor; and (f) pursued economically inferior debtor-
in-possession financing.221 
There is legal support for precluding the assumption and assignment 
of the league agreements and other key agreements.222  The case of In re 
Lee West Enterprises involved an analogous franchise setting, in which a 
court denied a trustee’s motion to assume and assign franchise agreements 
because the debtor/franchisee had committed an incurable default.223  Fur-
ther, the court in In re Deppe found that the debtor, a gasoline station oper-
ator, failed to comply with non-monetary provisions of its gasoline supply 
agreement, which required no lapse in business operations for seven con-
secutive days.224  The court found that the debtor’s default was incurable, 
precluding the debtor from assuming and assigning its rights under that 
agreement, stating:225 
 
219. Reply of Major League Baseball in Further Support of Its Motion to Terminate Exclu-
sivity or, in the Alternative, to Compel the Debtors to Seek Assumption or Rejection of the Base-
ball Agreements at 29, In re:  Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, No. 11–12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. 
Oct. 24, 2011), 2011 WL 5170773. 
220. Id. at 31–40. 
221. Id. at 33–35. 
222. In re Lee West Enters., Inc., 179 B.R. 204, 208–09 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1995); In re 
Deppe, 110 B.R. 898, 900, 903 (Bankr. D. Minn. 1990). 
223. In re Lee West Enters., 179 B.R. at 208–09. 
224. In re Deppe, 110 B.R. at 900, 903. 
225. Id. at 904. 
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[t]he lapse in operations took place.  The estate simply cannot 
overcome that historical fact.  Neither can it deny the signifi-
cance given to such a lapse under the agreements . . . ; as two 
courts have noted, the steady maintenance of gasoline station 
operations . . . fixed by franchise agreements is a key goodwill 
value to the refiner/distributor, which is given special deference 
in franchise litigation involving such businesses.  . . . .  The es-
tate cannot “undo” the historical event at this point.226 
Like the debtor in In re Deppe, MLB argued that the Dodgers commit-
ted numerous defaults with respect to the League Agreements and that the de-
faults are “historic events” the Dodgers could not “undo.”227  In contrast, the 
Dodgers argued it was not futile for the debtors to pursue a plan of reorganiza-
tion premised on the marketing of the Dodgers’ future telecast rights.228  To 
support this contrary view, the Dodgers claimed that “vague” allegations of an 
alleged breach are insufficient to constitute a material default.229 
In In re Pyramid Operating Authority, Inc., the court held that a con-
tract provision was too vague and subjective where it required the downtown 
sports arena to be operated “as a first class facility” and “in the best interest” 
of the city, particularly where the contract also required the notice of default 
to identify specific acts or omissions to show willful default.230  The court 
permitted the debtor to assume the executory contract, notwithstanding the 
alleged breached claims.231  However, the agreement at issue in that case re-
quired specific acts or omissions to show the default.232  In contrast, opera-
tive MLB League Agreements do not require such specificity before a breach 
can be determined.233  Thus, if MLB can establish that the Dodgers defaulted 
under the League Agreements, the Dodgers should be precluded from assign-
ing the League Agreements without MLB’s consent.234 
As to the alleged breach of the Fox Sports/Dodgers telecast rights agree-
ment, the Dodgers argued that the exclusive negotiation provisions in that 
 
226. Id. (internal citations omitted). 
227. Id.; Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 37–38. 
228.  Debtors’ Objection to Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity or 
Compel Assumption or Rejection of the Baseball Agreements at 45–55, In re:  Los Angeles 
Dodgers LLC, No. 11-12010 (KG) (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 7, 2011), 2011 WL 4945134. 
229. Id. 
230. In re Pyramid Operating Auth., Inc., 144 B.R. 795, 823 (Bankr. W.D. Tenn. 1992).  
231. Id.  
232. See id. 
233. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, §§ 3, 4. 
234. See In re Deppe, 110 B.R. at 904 (finding franchisee’s rights could be forfeited by ter-
mination of the agreement). 
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agreement were unenforceable in bankruptcy.235  While there is some case law 
to support the Dodgers’ contention,236 MLB cites to a more persuasive line of 
cases.  Exclusivity provisions are enforceable, even in bankruptcy.237 
In summary, compliance with league and other key agreements is the 
foundation of the sports team’s ability to operate the team as a member of 
the league.238  Incurable defaults under such agreements will likely render 
them non-assignable, even in bankruptcy reorganization.239  The end result 
will likely preclude a sports team from using bankruptcy to achieve a suc-
cessful reorganization.240 
B.  Can the Debtor Professional Sports Team Assume or Assign the League 
Agreements Without the League’s Consent? 
Membership in a professional sports league is the critical asset for any 
club that files Chapter 11 reorganization.241  Membership is recognized 
through the League Agreements.242  As part of the Chapter 11 reorganiza-
tion, the debtor sports team is authorized to assume or reject several types 
of executory contracts.243  The debtor’s ability to assume or assign such 
agreements is “vital” to a successful Chapter 11 reorganization.244 
League Agreements also are executory contracts,245 and, therefore, a 
key legal issue in any professional sports team bankruptcy is whether such 
agreements can be assumed or assigned under the Bankruptcy Code.246  If 
 
235. Debtors’ Objection to Motion of Major League Baseball, supra note 228, at 52–55. 
236. In re Big Rivers Elec. Corp., 233 B.R. 739, 751–52 (W.D. Ky. 1998) (finding that the 
no-shop clause prohibiting the debtor from entertaining competing offers for the sale or lease of 
its assets was “void as a violation of public policy”); In re Mr. Grocer, Inc., 77 B.R. 349, 353 
(Bankr. D. N.H. 1987) (finding unenforceable a right of first refusal in a lease where the landlord 
did not show any substantial economic detriment if the provision were not enforced). 
237. In re IT Group Inc., 302 B.R. 483, 488 (D. Del. 2003) (holding that the right of first 
refusal was not an impermissible ipso facto clause that restricted assignment and was enforceable, 
notwithstanding that the debtor was in bankruptcy); see also In re Capital Acquisitions & Mgmt. 
Corp., 341 B.R. 632, 637 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 2006); In re Wauka, Inc., 39 B.R. 734, 735, 738 
(Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1984). 
238. Anzivinio, supra note 5, at 28. 
239. Id. at 31. 
240. Id. at 28. 
241. Id. 
242. Id. 
243. 11 U.S.C. § 365(a). 
244. See NLRB v. Bildisco & Bildisco, 465 U.S. 513, 528 (1984). 
245. Anzivinio, supra note 5, at 28–29. 
246. See 11 U.S.C. § 365(c) (indicating when a trustee may assign or assume a debtor’s 
contract). 
07. DILLON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/30/2012  2:03 AM 
322 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:297 
the League Agreements are not capable of being assumed or assigned as 
part of the reorganization, the “practical effect is the death knell” for the 
debtor sports team.247  The reason is obvious:  without the League Agree-
ments, the debtor team does not exist as a member of the league, and “the 
value of the Debtor’s estate is nominal” at best.248 
Section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code codifies the rule that certain 
executory contracts cannot be assumed or assigned.249  Section 365(c) pro-
vides, in relevant part: 
The [debtor in possession] may not assume or assign any executo-
ry contract . . . of the debtor, whether or not such contract . . . pro-
hibits or restricts assignment of rights or delegation of duties, if— 
(1)(A) applicable law excuses a party, other than the 
debtor, to such contract . . . from accepting perfor-
mance from or rendering performance to an entity 
other than the debtor or the debtor in possession, 
whether or not such contract . . . prohibits or restricts 
assignment of rights or delegation of duties; and 
(B) such party does not consent to such assumption 
or assignment . . . .250 
In analyzing whether a debtor sports team may assume League Agreements 
in light of section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code, the Third Circuit has 
adopted the “hypothetical test.”251  Under this test, if the contract cannot be 
assigned under non-bankruptcy “applicable law,” it cannot be assumed or as-
signed by the debtor, absent the sports league’s consent.252  In applying the 
hypothetical test, courts emphasize that the “applicable law” rendering a con-
tract non-assumable or non-assignable under section 365(c) must prove that 
the identity of the contracting party is critical to the contract at issue.253 
 
247. Anzivinio, supra note 5, at 31. 
248. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 9. 
249. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c). 
250. Id. (emphasis added). 
251. In re W. Elecs., Inc., 852 F.2d 79 (3d Cir. 1988).  The hypothetical test also has been 
adopted by the Fourth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits.  See In re Sunterra Corp., 361 F.3d 257 (4th 
Cir. 2004); In re Catapult Entm’t, Inc., 165 F.3d 747 (9th Cir. 1999); In re James Cable Partners, 
L.P., 27 F.3d 534 (11th Cir. 1994) (per curiam).  
252. In re W. Elecs., Inc., 852 F.2d at 83. 
253. In re ANC Rental Corp., 278 B.R. 714, 721 (Bankr. D. Del. 2002) (“[W]e follow the 
majority of courts addressing this issue and conclude that, for section 365(c)(1) to apply, the ap-
plicable law must specifically state that the contracting party is excused from accepting perfor-
mance from a third party under circumstances where it is clear from the [law] that the identity of 
the contracting party is crucial to the contract or public safety is at issue.”). 
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In a professional sports team bankruptcy context, there are no pub-
lished decisions definitively holding that League Agreements are delegable 
under applicable law, absent the league’s consent.254  Perhaps this is be-
cause the stakes are so high.255  For example, if the league prevails and 
League Agreements are not delegable, the value of the debtor’s estate 
would be minimal, hindering a successful reorganization.256  If, however, 
the debtor team can successfully convince the bankruptcy court to interpret 
such agreements as assumable/assignable, membership in the league would 
be changed by judicial fiat and not by consent of the league and the other 
member teams.257 
These precise issues were at the forefront of the Los Angeles Dodg-
ers’ bankruptcy.258  MLB asserted that the League Agreements are neither 
assumable nor assignable under applicable state law and federal intellectual 
property law.259  The Dodgers, in contrast, claimed that there was no “ap-
plicable law” preventing the assumption or assignment of the League 
Agreements.260  Thus, the relevant inquiry is whether “applicable law” can 
excuse a professional sports league from accepting performance from, or 
rendering performance to, any entity other than the debtor sports team.261 
1.  Are the League Agreements Non-Assignable Because the League Is an 
Unincorporated Association? 
In the Dodgers’ bankruptcy, MLB argued that applicable law uni-
formly established that membership in an unincorporated association is not 
assignable without the consent of the association.262  The reasoning is that 
courts generally do not interfere with the internal workings of unincorpo-
rated associations.263  League Agreements are not assignable without con-
 
254. See Anzivinio, supra note 5, at 32–36 (discussing the various approaches courts have 
adopted when identifying delegable contracts, all requiring league consent). 
255. See id. (discussing three ways to view franchise contracts all of which would have ter-
rible repercussions for the league). 
256. Id. at 32. 
257. Id. at 32–36. 
258. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 39–46. 
259. Id. 
260. Debtors’ Objection to Motion of Major League Baseball, supra note 228, at 56–73. 
261. Id. 
262. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 39–41. 
263. Professional Sports:  Restraining the League Commissioner’s Prerogatives in an Era 
of Player Mobility, 19 WM. & MARY L. REV. 281, 284 (1977); see, e.g., In re Dewey Ranch 
Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. 577, 591–93 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 2009) (acknowledging the league’s “right 
to admit only new members who meet its written requirements” and denying sale of a hockey 
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sent, precisely because membership in the unincorporated association gen-
erally is considered a privilege that may be granted or withheld, not a right 
that can be obtained independently and then forced upon the unincorpo-
rated association.264 
In response, the Dodgers argued that “interests” in the membership of 
an unincorporated association are “somewhat assignable.”265  Thus, there 
was no “applicable law” precluding the assumption or assignment of the 
League Agreements.266  Therefore, the focus should be on the identity of 
the third party assignee based upon the nature of the entity in question.267  
With that focus, the debtor sports team will contend that League Agree-
ments should be assignable provided that the entity has the financial 
strength and expertise to manage the sports team, even if the consent of the 
league is not obtained.268 
The Dodgers also relied on cases involving seats on stock or com-
modities exchanges, contending that the exchanges are unincorporated as-
sociations and that the membership seats are assignable.269  Such cases do 
not support the proposition that League Agreements can be assigned with-
out the league’s approval because they dealt with the stock exchange, not 
sports leagues.270  In fact, the MLB Constitution prohibits the transfer of a 
 
team’s assets over the NHL’s objection because the debtor could not provide adequate protection 
of the NHL’s interest in enforcing its approval rights); In re Magness, 972 F.2d 689, 696 (6th Cir. 
1992) (finding that an Ohio law prohibiting courts from interfering in the internal workings of 
associations in the application of their rationally developed rules and procedures prevented debtor 
from assigning contract for golf membership in private club); Affiliated Gov’t Employees’ Dis-
trib. Co. v. Comm’r Int. Rev., 322 F.2d 872, 873 (9th Cir. 1963) (noting that membership in Cali-
fornia retail association was not transferable).  
264. See, e.g., 6 AM. JUR. 2D Assocs. & Clubs § 17 (2008) (“Membership in a voluntary 
unincorporated association generally is held to be a privilege which may be accorded or withheld, 
and not a right which can be gained independently and then enforced.  Generally, courts will not 
compel admission to a voluntary association . . . .”) (footnote omitted).  
265. Debtors’ Objection to Motion of Major League Baseball, supra note 228, at 58–59. 
266. Id.; see also Allentown Ambassadors, Inc. v. Northeast American Baseball, LLC (In re 
Allentown Ambassadors, Inc.), 361 B.R. 422, 449 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2007) (finding that under 
North Carolina law, an LLC interest was “somewhat assignable”). 
267. Debtors’ Objection to Motion of Major League Baseball, supra note 228, at 65. 
268. Id. 
269. Id. at 64; e.g., Bd. of Trade of Chicago v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 1, 12 (1924) (finding that 
a seat was transferable property and should pass to the bankruptcy trustee, subject to the rules of 
the exchange); O’Dell v. Boyden, 150 F. 731, 735–36 (6th Cir. 1906) (finding that membership in 
the New York Stock Exchange was personal to the holder, but could only be transferred to a new 
member satisfactory to them, subject to the rules of the exchange and by the consent of its admis-
sions committee). 
270. Johnson, 264 U.S. at 12 (finding that a seat was transferable property and should pass 
to bankruptcy trustee, subject to the rules of the exchange); O’Dell, 150 F. at 735–36 (finding that 
membership in the New York Stock Exchange was personal to the holder, but could only be 
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controlling interest in any team without first obtaining the required vote of 
a majority of the teams.271 
Similarly, in Hyde v. Woods, the issue was whether membership in 
the San Francisco Stock Exchange, a voluntary association, may be trans-
ferred after an individual member filed bankruptcy pursuant only to the as-
sociation’s rules.272  The Supreme Court held: 
[a] seat in this board is not a matter of absolute purchase.  Though 
we have said it is property, it is encumbered with conditions when 
purchased, without which it could not be obtained.  It never was 
free from . . . conditions . . . , neither when . . . [the debtor] 
bought, nor at any time before or since.  That rule entered into and 
became an incident of the property when it was created, and re-
mains a part of it into whose hands soever it may come.273 
Thus, even in bankruptcy, the League Agreements should prevail.274  
These agreements should prevail because applicable unincorporated associ-
ation law precludes assumption or assignment of such agreements without 
the league’s consent.275  Further, even if the bankruptcy court allows the 
assumption or assignment of the League Agreements, the court should 
make the assumption or assignment subject to the rules and regulations set 
forth in such agreements.276 
2.  Are the League Agreements Non-Assignable Because the League Is 
Akin to a Sports Franchise? 
In the Dodgers’ bankruptcy, MLB argued that the law governing 
professional sports leagues (a subset of the law of unincorporated associa-
tions) controls the identity of its members by precluding assumption or 
assignment of memberships in such leagues.277  The basic premise is that 
the economic interdependence of membership in the professional sports 
league requires protection against unilateral assumption or assignment of 
such membership.278 
 
transferred to a new member satisfactory to them, subject to the rules of the exchange and by the 
consent of its admissions committee). 
271. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. V, § 2(b)(2). 
272. Hyde v. Woods, 94 U.S. 523, 524–25 (1876). 
273. Id. at 525. 
274. Id. (stating that transferring an ownership interest in an organization is subject to con-
ditions stated in the governing body’s constitution). 
275. See id. (holding that transfers are encumbered with conditions). 
276. Id. 
277. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 41–42. 
278. Id. 
07. DILLON (DO NOT DELETE) 12/30/2012  2:03 AM 
326 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES ENTERTAINMENT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 32:297 
For example, a league’s refusal to grant a new franchise was found not 
to constitute an antitrust violation, because the business “interdependence” of 
the team owners, through their leagues, required that the sale of the franchise 
be approved by a majority of the team owners rather than only by the selling 
owner.279  Similarly, a debtor’s attempt to sell its NHL franchise to a third 
party, notwithstanding the NHL’s membership approval rights, was rejected 
by the court, which held that section 363(e) of the Bankruptcy Code required 
the courts to prohibit any sale where there is no “adequate protection.”280  
Although the court relied on Bankruptcy Code section 363(e), rather than 
section 365(c)(1), the court’s reasoning sought to protect the NHL’s mem-
bership selection rights.281  In an analogous setting, a court also prohibited 
the sale of a golf membership because “[t]he interests of the persons present-
ly involved . . . cannot adequately be protected in any manner, except by 
prohibiting the sale and assignment of the membership.”282 
However, the Dodgers contended that such cases were decided in the 
context of contractual anti-assignment provisions contained in the league’s 
governing documents or under different provisions of the Bankruptcy 
Code, and therefore, they were inapplicable or distinguishable.283  Further, 
the Dodgers argued that where the law is equivocal, as here, the court ulti-
mately must make a factual determination concerning the “materiality” of 
the identity of the proposed assignee.284  The Dodgers asserted that any fu-
ture assignee would have the required financial strength and expertise to 
manage the team, even if MLB withholds its consent.285 
Professional sports leagues, which are unique and economically inter-
dependent, should not have membership imposed on the league.286  There is 
“applicable law” prohibiting assignment of such membership, absent the 
requisite approval.287 
 
279. Mid-South Grizzlies v. Nat’l Football League, 550 F. Supp. 558, 566 (E.D. Pa. 1982) 
(quoting N. Am. Soccer League v. Nat’l Football League, 670 F.2d 1249, 1253 (2d Cir. 1982)). 
280. In re Dewey Ranch Hockey, LLC, 414 B.R. at 591–92. 
281. Id. at 591. 
282. In re Magness, 972 F.2d at 697. 
283. Objection of Major League Baseball, supra note 33, at 65–67. 
284. Id. (citing In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc., 361 B.R. at 454–55). 
285. Objection of Major League Baseball, supra note 33, at 67. 
286. Mid-South Grizzlies, 550 F. Supp. at 566 (quoting N. Am. Soccer League, 670 F.2d 
at 1253. 
287. Id. 
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3.  Are the League Agreements Non-Assignable Because the League Is 
Akin to a Joint Venture or Partnership? 
Similarly, MLB has contended that the League Agreements are simi-
lar to partnership or joint venture membership agreements and that partner-
ship/joint venture law prevents assumption or assignment of a partner’s 
membership without consent of all the partners/members.288  The Dodgers, 
of course, argued otherwise. 
The Dodgers asserted that partnership/joint venture’s economic inter-
ests are “somewhat assignable” and, therefore, the legal analysis is no differ-
ent from the law governing unincorporated associations.289  Because partner-
ship/joint venture membership is not assignable, but the economic interests 
in those entities may be, the Dodgers claimed that the law remained ambigu-
ous, prompting application of the rule that requires a factual evaluation of the 
“materiality” of the assignee’s “identity.”290 
In assessing the merits of each position, the fundamental issue centers 
on the League Agreements and whether they are assumable/assignable.  
Without those agreements, a professional sports team cannot become a 
member of the league, an unincorporated association.291  Applicable law 
appears to preclude assumption or assignment of such agreements because 
courts are not willing to impose such agreements absent the other parties’ 
consent or approval.292  As a result, the bankruptcy court should recognize 
and apply MLB’s consent/approval rights as a condition of any assump-
tion/assignment of any league agreements. 
 
288. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 42–43; 
see In re Schick, 235 B.R. 318, 325 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1999) (refusing to force the objecting party 
to accept substitute performance from or render performance to a “stranger” in applying partner-
ship law); see also In re New Era Co., 115 B.R. 41, 44 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1990) (finding that a 
person cannot become a member of a partnership without “the consent of all the partners”). 
289. In re Allentown Ambassadors, Inc., 361 B.R. 442; Debtors’ Objection to Motion of 
Major League Baseball, supra note 228, at 64. 
290. Debtors’ Objection to Motion of Major League Baseball, supra note 228, at 64. 
291. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 42–43; 
see In re Schick, 235 B.R. at 325 (refusing to force the objecting party to accept substitute per-
formance from or render performance to a “stranger” in applying partnership law); see also In re 
New Era Co., 115 B.R. at 44 (finding that a person cannot become a member of a partnership 
without “the consent of all the partners”). 
292. See In re Schick, 235 B.R. at 325 (refusing to force the objecting party to accept substi-
tute performance from or render performance to a “stranger” in applying partnership law); see 
also In re New Era Co., 115 B.R. at 44 (finding that a person cannot become a member of a part-
nership without “the consent of all the partners”). 
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4.  Are the League Agreements Non-Assignable Because They Are Based 
on Personal Confidence and Trust, Akin to Personal Services? 
Non-bankruptcy “applicable law” provides that executory contracts 
involving personal services cannot be assumed or assigned without the 
consent of the other party.293  In the Dodgers’ bankruptcy, MLB relied on 
such law by analogy, and contended that the League Agreements were not 
delegable because they were based on the personal trust and confidence be-
tween MLB and its thirty clubs.294  MLB also relied on its Constitution, 
which required a vote of three-fourths of the MLB clubs to approve the 
“sale or transfer” of a controlling interest in any club.295 
The Dodgers asserted otherwise.296  The Dodgers argued persuasively 
that the League Agreements should not be construed as personal services 
contracts because the Dodgers’ assets could be transferred to an adequately 
capitalized entity with little or no impact upon MLB or the other MLB 
clubs; therefore, no reason existed to extend the law of non-assignable per-
sonal services contracts to the professional sports context.297 
The issue of whether membership in a professional sports league is 
akin to a personal services contract has been raised, but not yet an-
swered.298  Therefore, again, the stakes are high in presenting the issue for 
judicial resolution.299  If MLB prevails, the League Agreements would not 
be assignable, precluding a team’s reorganization plan, unless it obtains 
MLB’s consent.300  If the team prevails, however, it could clear the way for 
the assumption and assignment of the League Agreements to another ade-
quately capitalized entity, without MLB’s consent. 
On balance, the League Agreements are not likely to fall within a per-
sonal service contract exception to otherwise assignable executory agree-
ments.301  No reason exists to extend or broaden the limited personal ser-
 
293. See, e.g., Coykendall v. Jackson, 17 Cal. App. 2d 729, 731 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1936) 
(precluding personal services contracts from being assigned); Bentley v. Textile Banking Co., 26 
A.D.2d 112, 114 (N.Y. App. Div. 1966) (acknowledging that personal services contracts are not 
assignable without consent of the other party). 
294. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 44. 
295. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. V, § 2(b)(2). 
296. Debtors’ Objection to Motion of Major League Baseball, supra note 228, at 67–71. 
297. Id. at 69–71. 
298. In re Lehigh Valley Prof’l Sports Clubs, Inc., 2000 WL 567905, *5, n. 17 (Bankr. E.D. 
Pa. 2000). 
299. Richard L. Wynne et al., Sports Fanchises and Bankruptcy Law, ABI BANKR. 
BATTLEGROUND WEST, Mar. 19, 1999, at 10–11.  
300. Id. 
301. Anzivino, supra note 5, at 32–36. 
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vices contract exception to cover professional sports teams; and, in any 
case, MLB’s other grounds for precluding assumption/assignment are more 
persuasive (e.g., applicable law precluding assignment of MLB member-
ship in an unincorporated association).302 
5.  Are the League Agreements Non-Assignable  
Because They Contain Intellectual Rights Owned by the League  
that Are Not Assignable Under Federal Law? 
Interestingly, MLB League Agreements, like those of other profes-
sional leagues, include intellectual rights (e.g., trademarks, copyrights) that 
may not be delegable under section 365(c) of the Bankruptcy Code.303  
Such rights are generally considered personal and non-delegable.304  Feder-
al law prohibits the assignment of both copyrights and trademarks because 
holders of such rights “share a common retained interest in the ownership 
of their intellectual property—an interest that would be severely diminished 
if a licensee were allowed to sub-license without the licensor’s permis-
sion.”305  MLB relied on this federal law, arguing that the League Agree-
ments contain both trademark and copyright rights, which prohibit the as-
sumption and assignment of such rights.306 
The Dodgers argued that federal trademark and copyright law do not 
clearly prohibit the assignment of MLB intellectual property rights.307  
However, the Dodgers’ attempt to distinguish the federal law cited by MLB 
is unpersuasive.  For example, the Dodgers rely heavily on In re Golden 
Books Family Entertainment, Inc.308  However, the legal issue in that case 
turned on whether the subject executory agreement was exclusive or non-
 
302. Id. 
303. 11 U.S.C. § 365(c). 
304. See In re XMH Corp., 647 F.3d 690, 695 (7th Cir. 2011) (disallowing a debtor to as-
sign a trademark under section 365(c) because “the universal rule is that trademark licenses are 
not assignable in the absence of a clause expressly authorizing assignment”); N.C.P. Mktg. Grp. 
v. Blanks (In re N.C.P. Mktg. Grp., Inc.), 337 B.R. 230, 236–37 (D. Nev. 2005), aff’d, 279 F. 
App’x 561 (9th Cir. 2008) (“Because the owner of the trademark has an interest in the party to 
whom the trademark is assigned so that it can maintain the goodwill, quality, and value of its 
products and thereby its trademark, trademark rights are personal to the assignee and not freely 
assignable to a third party.”).  
305. Miller v. Glenn Miller Prods., 318 F. Supp. 2d 923, 938 (C.D. Cal. 2004), aff’d, 454 
F.3d 975 (9th Cir. 2006). 
306. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 44–46. 
307. Objection of Major League Baseball to Debtors’ Motion to Obtain Post-Petition Fi-
nancing and for Related Relief, at 71–73, In re:  Los Angeles Dodgers LLC, No. 11-12010 (KG), 
2011 WL 4945134 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct. 7, 2011). 
308. In re Golden Books Family Entm’t, Inc., 269 B.R. 311 (Bankr. D. Del. 2001).  
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exclusive.309  The court held that the agreement was an exclusive license, 
which was freely transferable.310  However, the court also recognized that 
non-exclusive licensing rights are personal in nature and may not be as-
signed in bankruptcy.311 
In the context of professional baseball, neither MLB nor the Dodgers 
appear to dispute that the trademarks and copyrights held by MLB are non-
exclusively granted for use by all thirty MLB clubs.312  As such, MLB’s li-
censing rights should be construed as non-exclusive and, therefore, personal 
in nature to the MLB clubs and may not be assigned in bankruptcy without 
MLB’s consent.313  Again, no case has decided this question in the context of 
a professional sports league.  The issue, therefore, remains unresolved. 
B.  Can Major League Baseball Terminate the Los Angeles Dodgers from 
the League by Filing Bankruptcy or Does Such Termination Constitute an 
Unenforceable Ipso Facto Clause? 
Ipso facto clauses, which terminate a contract upon the bankruptcy, 
insolvency, or change in financial condition of a party, generally are unen-
forceable in bankruptcy.314  Nonetheless, a professional sports team’s bank-
ruptcy filing often constitutes grounds for termination of the team’s mem-
bership in the league.315  For example, the MLB Constitution provides for 
involuntary termination of a team, with approval of three-fourths of all 
MLB clubs, if a team files for bankruptcy.316  Relying on the MLB Consti-
tution, MLB argued in the Dodgers’ bankruptcy that such ipso facto bank-
ruptcy default previsions are enforceable pursuant to section 365(e)(2)(A) 
 
309. Id. at 315–16. 
310. Id. at 316, 319. 
311. Id. at 314; see also In re Valley Medai, Inc., 279 B.R. 105, 135–36 (Bankr. D. Del. 
2002) (holding that non-exclusive copyrights are not assignable under Bankruptcy Code section 
365(c)); In re Patient Educ. Media, 210 B.R. 237, 242–43 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1997) (holding that 
debtor could not assign its non-exclusive license without copyright owner’s consent). 
312. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 44–46 
(Oct. 7, 2011); Objection of Major League Baseball, supra note 33, at 71–73.  
313. See In re XMH Corp., 647 F.3d at 695 (disallowing a debtor to assign a trademark un-
der section 365(c) because “the universal rule is that trademark licenses are not assignable in the 
absence of a clause expressly authorizing assignment”); In re N.C.P. Mktg. Grp., Inc., 337 B.R. at 
236–37, aff’d 279 F. App’x 561 (“Because the owner of the trademark has an interest in the party 
to whom the trademark is assigned so that it can maintain the goodwill, quality, and value of its 
products and thereby its trademark, trademark rights are personal to the assignee and not freely 
assignable to a third party.”).  
314. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(1). 
315. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 4(f), (j), (l).  
316. Id. § 4(l); see also Anzivinio, supra note 5, at 35 n.225. 
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of the Bankruptcy Code to the extent that the League Agreements are found 
to be non-assignable pursuant to applicable law.317 
Bankruptcy Code section 365(e)(2)(A) provides an exception to the un-
enforceability of ipso facto bankruptcy default provisions when the subject 
executory contract is non-assumable/assignable.318  As shown above, in the 
Dodgers’ bankruptcy, MLB contended that the League Agreements are not 
delegable under non-bankruptcy applicable law.319  Therefore, MLB claimed 
that the Third Circuit precedent applies to render such ipso facto provisions 
enforceable, citing Watts v. Pennsylvania Housing Finance Co.320 
In Watts, debtors who had received benefits under a mortgage assis-
tance program brought suit against government officials for terminating 
their benefits upon filing for bankruptcy.321  Among other things, the debt-
ors contended that the loan program’s ipso facto bankruptcy default provi-
sion violated the automatic stay provisions under section 362 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code.322  The Third Circuit rejected the debtor’s argument, holding 
that the commitment to provide mortgage assistance was a non-delegable 
executory contract to “make a loan or extend other debt financing or finan-
cial accommodations, to or for the benefit of the debtor” under sections 
365(c)(2) and 365(e)(2)(B) of the Bankruptcy Code.323  The Third Circuit 
also found that the automatic stay provisions were inapplicable to such a 
contract; therefore, the automatic stay provisions were not violated.324 
While the Watts decision was decided under a different Bankruptcy 
Code provision, the same rationale applies to render ipso facto clauses en-
forceable to the extent they are found to be part of a non-assignable execu-
tory contract, pursuant to section 365(e)(2)(A) of the Bankruptcy Code.  
Indeed, the Bankruptcy Code generally provides for parallel treatment of 
loans or other “financial accommodation” contracts and non-assignable ex-
ecutory contracts.325 
In the Dodgers’ bankruptcy, MLB did not vigorously advance the va-
lidity of the ipso facto bankruptcy default provisions in the MLB Constitu-
 
317. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 62, n. 73. 
318. 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(A). 
319. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 36–50. 
320. Watts v. Pa. Hous. Fin. Co., 876 F.2d 1090, 1095–96 (3d Cir. 1989).  
321. Id. at 1091–92. 
322. Id. at 1092.  
323. Id. at 1095. 
324. Id. 
325. Compare 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(A), with 11 U.S.C. § 365(e)(2)(B). 
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tion.326  The likely reason is that the MLB Constitution itself requires the ap-
proval of three-fourths of all MLB clubs in order to initiate an involuntary 
termination.327  This approval cannot be obtained because the Bankruptcy 
Code automatic stay provision suspends all such creditor activity.328  The au-
tomatic stay’s broad scope would likely preclude MLB from initiating a vote 
from three-fourths of all the MLB clubs to effectuate involuntary termina-
tion.329  MLB, of course, could seek a court order granting relief from the au-
tomatic stay in order to initiate involuntary termination voting procedures.330  
However, MLB did not seek any such relief during the Dodgers’ bankrupt-
cy.331  The likely reason for not seeking such relief is that it would require 
twenty-three of the thirty MLB clubs to approve the termination of 
McCourt’s membership in the league, a daunting endeavor at best.332 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
Several unanswered legal issues are raised in the context of profes-
sional sports team bankruptcies.333  Definitive judicial resolution of such 
issues may prove beneficial or detrimental depending upon the perspective 
of the entity.334  As a practical matter, it is likely that any plan of reorgani-
zation by a professional sports team will be forced to abide by the duties 
and restrictions in the league and other key agreements.335  After all, such 
agreements represent valid executory contracts that must be in place to suc-
cessfully reorganize a team and still maintain the team’s membership in the 
league.336  Without that membership, the team is essentially without sub-
stantive value.337 
There will be winners and losers when the field of play is the bankrupt-
cy court.338  Baseball is a game; it is America’s game.339  But, it is also a 
 
326. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72, at 62, n.73. 
327. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 4(l). 
328. 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). 
329. Id. § 362(a)(1)–(8). 
330. Id. § 362(d)(1). 
331. Motion of Major League Baseball to Terminate Exclusivity, supra note 72. 
332. MAJOR LEAGUE CONST. art. VIII, § 4(l). 
333. Wynne et al., supra note 299; Golden & Marticello, supra note 26. 
334. Wynne et al., supra note 299. 
335. Id. 
336. Anzivinio, supra note 5, at 28. 
337. Id. at 31. 
338. Golden & Marticello, supra note 26. 
339. Hanson, supra note 1. 
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business – a serious, high stakes multi-billion dollar business.340  In the end, 
the better play may be for the parties to create a level playing field based on 
resolution.341  The winner in that contest would be the game of baseball.342 
 
340. ROSNER & SHROPSHIRE, supra note 4. 
341. Golden & Marticello, supra note 26. 
342. At the time this article went to press, the sale of the Dodger franchise was still in a bid-
ding process.  See Alex Ben Block, Sale of Dodgers Officially Completed, HOLLYWOOD RPTR. 
(May 1, 2012), http://www.hollywoodreporter.com/news/la-dodgers-sale-magic-johnson-318581.  
Subsequently, however, on April 14, 2012, a Delaware bankruptcy judge approved the sale of the 
Dodgers, and on May 1, 2012, the Gughenheim Group finalized and closed a historic $2.15 bil-
lion dollar deal for the team’s acquisition.  Id.  The new ownership is led by Guggenheim group 
CEO Mark Walter, Earvin “Magic” Johnson, and Stan Kasten.  Id.  In addition to maintaining an 
ownership interest in the nearby land that is used for parking around Dodger stadium, Frank 
McCourt is expected to gain nearly $1 billion dollars from this deal.  Id. 
